

країни. У порівнянні з інвестиціями в інші різні форми капіталу, інвестиції в людський капітал є найбільш вигідними як з погляду окремої людини, так і з погляду всього суспільства, тому що вони забезпечують значний за обсягом, тривалий за часом й інтегральний за характером економічний і соціальний ефект.

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UDC 330

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THEORY OF REGULATION AS A SUBJECT OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

The contemporary institutional economics has developed various regulation theories. The positive-normative regulation theory, the economic regulation theory and the capture theory are the most famous of them. These theories develop on the basis of Anglo-American economics and have a strictly economic dimension. Here, regulation is understood as activities of the state or regulation agencies undertaken in order to improve coordination function of markets. The French School of Regulation, which has developed in the 1970's within French heterodox economics carries out the analysis of regulation not only in the regulation dimension, but also in the wider, institutional and social one. The article explains the fundamental assumptions of regulation theory from the point of view of these two approaches.

Сучасні інституційна економіка розвинула різноманітні регуляційні теорії. Позитивістсько-нормативна регуляційна теорія, економічна регуляційна теорія та теорія захвату – найбільш популярні з них. Ці теорії розвиваються на основі англо-американських економік та мають чіткий економічний вимір. В цьому випадку регулювання розуміється як діяльність державних чи регулюючих органів, направлена на покращення координаційної функції ринку. Французька школа регулювання, яка розвивалась в 1970-х в рамках французьких неортодоксальних економік проводить регулятивний аналіз не стільки через вимір регулювання, скільки в біль широкому – інституційному і соціальному вимірі. В статті пояснюються основні припущення теорії регулювання з точки зору цих двох підходів.

Современные институциональная экономика развила различные регуляционные теории . Позитивистской - нормативная регуляционные теория , экономическая регуляционные теория и теория захвата - наиболее популярные из них . Эти теории развиваются на основе англо - американских экономик и имеют четкое экономическое измерение. В этом случае регулировка понимается как деятельность государственных или регулирующих органов , направленная на улучшение координационной функции рынка . Французская школа регулирования , которая развивалась в 1970 - х в рамках французских неортодоксальных экономик проводит регулятивный анализ не столько через измерение регулирования , сколько в боль широком - институциональном и социальном измерении . В статье объясняются основные предположения теории регулирования с точки зрения этих двух подходов .

Key words: theory of regulation, economic analysis, institutional economics, market functions, Anglo-American economics.

Among regulation theories which are included in the stream of new institutional economics, the new institutionalism, the following theories can be distinguished: the positive -normative theory, the economic regulation theory, the capture theory and the French School of Regulation. The first three are basically developed on the basis of Anglo-American economics while the last one emerged within the French economic thought. The basic categories, the level of analysis and the research area are differently interpreted depending on the choice: the Anglo-American or the French School of Regulation.

The division between the Anglo-American and the French approach is a sort of simplification but it constitutes a very useful tool of analysis in this article. The character and size of this article allows only a limited synthetic presentation of regulation theory with the two approaches. Therefore, this consideration does not exhaust the issue and are only an introduction to a wide research area.

Economic regulation in Anglo-American economics

The literature on the subject presents numerous, sometimes ambiguous, definitions of regulation. This category is also differently interpreted in different fields of science: economics, law and widely understood social sciences.

On the grounds of economics the most widespread is the Anglo-American approach in which regulation is understood as a form of regulation influence of the state upon economy. Regulation can also be explained by the following definitions:

- the state influence on the chosen branches, services or certain enterprises [1, p.125 and further],
- institutional frames which aim at state control and supervision of activities of certain branches and particularly those which are socially useful,
- general rules of social and economic order which refer to the method of allocation of resources, type of ownership and national income distribution [2, p . 217 – 218],
- a result of applying the power to coerce by the state [3, p. 244]

R. Posner proposed the approach of understanding regulation as taxation „the term [regulation] refers to taxes and subsidies of all sorts as well as to explicit legislative and administrative controls over rates, entry, and other facets of economic activity” [4, p. 335]. This approach, however, has not been commonly accepted by economists.

American literature on the subject distinguishes between the economic regulation and the social regulation. The social regulation concerns, first of all, the dimension of national safety, public health, protection of the environment, consumer rights. It can be assumed that it has a social dimension. The economic regulation concerns, most importantly, the failures of market mechanisms and the direct influence of the regulation subject (regulation decisions and actions) on the production conditions and the access of businesses to the market. [2, p. 217]. Although the range of the economic regulation is narrower than the social regulation, it has been a subject of interest to theory of regulation on the American ground. By the way, it is worth mentioning that the significance of the social regulation is growing [5, p. 655].

Theories of economic regulation refer to a complimentary role of the state towards the market mechanisms in the economic processes. In modern theories the objective of the state is not a typical interventionism as in the Keynesian solutions, but the improvement of coordinating functions of the markets, creating conditions for their effective and efficient operation, and not their factual control. This refers to the real sphere as well as the financial market. The regulations from the state which are a reaction to market failure allow to increase social coherence, as well as, the efficiency of economic policy [6, p. 229]. They give rise to new indispensable market institutions which support new markets and create favourable conditions for competition providing protection for other entities and, in particular, consumers.

Economists distinguish between a narrow and a wide approach of economic regulation. In the wide approach, the most widespread is the interpretation by A. Kahn, which defines regulation as any influence of the state on the economic reality with legal, administrative or tax constraints. [7, p. 307] However, this approach is not commonly applied when considering economic regulation.

The narrow approach is identified with regulation, administrative and legislative activities which are conducted by subjects responsible for regulation. Regulation in the narrow approach refers to general rules or specific activities undertaken by regulation agencies, which affect corporate decisions about influencing demand and supply in the real and monetary sphere. [8, p. 11-26].

With its restrictive activity, economic regulation affects corporate decisions concerning prices, quantities of good or entering or leaving a market [5, p. 307]. The quality of the product, the use of intermediate good in the production stage, imposing certain technological solutions or other restrictions on enterprises or branches are not commonly used.

Taking as a starting point for analysis the narrow approach, the theory of regulation tries to indicate the factors explaining reasons why certain markets or branches undergo public regulation and others do not.

In the theory of economics two alternative approaches to public analysis of

economic regulation were created. Depending on the approach it can be identified as:

- a tool to correct market inefficiencies and to improve social welfare (normative theory),
- a tool serving individual and group interests (positive theories).

In the conditions of perfect equilibrium, in a perfectly competitive market, phenomenon of maximization of public welfare appears. This situation means optimal equilibrium in Pareto efficiency. However, in economic reality in numerous markets the conditions of competitive model are not fulfilled, which means that equilibrium in these markets is ineffective or optimal, in the understanding of Pareto optimality. Normative theory of regulation states that if inefficiency generates costs and loss which outnumber the regulation cost, the state should undertake regulation activities in order to minimize the loss, or in other words to maximize social prosperity [2, p.224-225].

The normative approach perceives the public regulation as the state's reaction to market failure and, resulting from this situation, the necessity of correcting market mechanism. According to this approach, the regulation decisions should be preceded by normative analysis and confirming the existence of market failure. Next the ways of required reaction from the government should be indicated. The analysis should clearly determine the probability of market failures caused by the regulation.

The normative approach is fully reflected in the regulation theory based on public interest) (public interest theory of regulation), which is also called normative analysis as a positive theory. [9, p.36]. Public theory of regulation treats regulation activities as a sign of political pressure imposed by the society in order to correct market failures, such as monopoly power, externalities, asymmetries of information, which may lead to decrease in productivity or social prosperity.

Public regulation implies the necessity of limiting individual interests in order to secure state strategically important points (such as national defence, public goods supplies, etc.) as well as, minimization of public cost, socially beneficial allocation of assets or an increase in effectiveness of market mechanism. Market mistakes legitimize regulation activities undertaken by public institutions.

Normative analysis has, however, been exposed to wide criticism, on the basis of which alternative theories of regulation referring to positive approach have been created. In positive theories economic regulation refers to activities generating benefit for narrow interest groups, and not for the general public. This approach is accepted by representatives of economic theory of regulation who perceive regulation as a complex process of political control in which public interest is common with the interest of narrow groups. The theory based on private interest claims that regulation intervention is a result of individual interest groups' pressure. They try to influence politicians and regulators in order to capture economic rents at the cost of dispersed groups.

One of the founders of this theory is J. Stigler from the Chicago School of Economics. According to Stigler the regulation theory based on public interest does not explain all the forms of economic regulation conducted by the state or high profit

rates in the regulation sectors. What is more, the frequency of regulation activities (contestable market) is too high and the regulation is too ineffective.

Regulatory capture is a consequence of regulation service market existence. These services concern the activities connected with foreign and domestic competition (imposing the barriers of entrance), the financial help from the state, establishing technical standards, etc. Economic regulation is looked into as goods which are the subject of exchange on the regulation service market. In this market, which is similar to other goods and services markets, there are fundamental microeconomic categories, such as demand and supply of regulation, as well as, factors determining these categories. The supply is determined by politicians and bureaucrats from regulation agencies. Groups of interest put forward the demand for the regulation service and put pressure on political and regulation decision-makers. The objective of interest groups is gaining extraordinary profits in comparison with the equilibrium price and capturing the extraordinary profits. For these groups regulation solutions may be cheaper than cartel contracts and agreements and, at the same, time they can limit possibilities of entering the market by other businesses. Economic regulation is, therefore, a result of interaction between the subjects representing the demand and the supply in the regulation market, that is between politicians and civil servants and the groups which put forward the demand for regulation. 'Capturing' a regulator enables realization of particular groups interests which are not in accordance with the interest of the general public. Regulatory capture explains the situation in which a public regulation institution serves private or branch interests, despite the fact that it should act for the good of the general public. Capturing a regulation is a failure and inefficiency of the state.

Numerous models have been proposed within the regulation theory. The meaning of this approach comes down to an assumption that the state has the power to coerce. The basis of all the decisions made by entities present on the market (political and economic subjects: politicians, legislative and administrative decision-makers in regulation agencies as well as entrepreneurs) is their particularistic interest and aiming at maximization of their individual benefits. The objective of political decision-makers is gaining or sustaining power. Groups of interest support politicians in their aspirations expecting favourable decisions about the regulations. Narrow interest groups carry low costs of the political activities, receiving, in return, high marginal profit resulting from favouring regulation solution. The game of interests between interested groups, regulation institutions and entrepreneurs or branches, leads to gaining benefit from the regulation. Regulation is, therefore, more beneficial for the interest groups, than for the consumers.

In the economic regulation theory approach public regulation activities are, therefore, undertaken only for the individual benefits and for the willingness to maximize political support from political and legislative decision-makers.

In Anglo-American theory synthetic approach has been proposed. It is a synthesis of normative approach and economic regulation theory. An example can be the problem interpretation in context of a principal and agent. In this theory groups of pressure (entrepreneurs, consumers) maximize their utility. Regulation institution is

a subordinate of both politicians and economic entities under regulation and it also aims at profit maximalization. The objective of legislators is, however, maximization of public welfare, and not only welfare of individual subjects. In this respect, the principal and agent theory is coincident with normative regulation theory. An important assumption made by the principal and agent theory is the thesis about asymmetries of information, or an uneven access to information which is basic for decision-making. Subjects which are not under administrative regulation have better knowledge and information, which they do not share with regulation agency. Asymmetry of information facilitates making decisions in favour of an interested sector or branch. Thus, decisions made in the conditions of asymmetry of information can generate low efficiency of economic subjects and, as a result, lead to increase of social costs in the context of general welfare.

Regulation in the interpretation of The French School of Regulation

The interpretation of regulation by the French School of Regulation radically differs from the traditional approach of orthodox economics. The question of regulation does not appear in the discussion on the role of the state in economy, or the failures in coordinating the market by market mechanism. Regulation is referred to, in the wide context, as an institutional adjustment, or adapting economic and social system [11, p. 195].

Understanding of regulation on the grounds of French economics implies the necessity of explaining the basic assumptions of the School. The theory of regulation in French approach has been developing since the end of the so called *trente glorieuses* (The Glorious Thirty), when the first symptoms of reversing post-war growth cycle. The starting point for the analysis in the 1970's was to examine the relation between functioning capitalistic economy and its crises. In the first stage the research concentrated on macroeconomic analysis of national systems and the reasons why the capitalistic economies entered crisis in the 1970's. The researchers, concentrated first of all around the works of M. Aglietta, A. Orléan, R. Boyer and A. Lipietz, assumed that the same economic system that is capitalism can have various forms depending on existing institutional conditions.

The French School of Regulation which is situated in the stream of heterodox economics, takes its intellectual and methodological inspiration from various economic theories, in particular Keynesian economics and Post-Keynesian economics, but also from Marxist economics (especially in the first period of forming regulationists' views). The theoretical basis of the regulation theory is, similarly to Keynesian approach, an assumption that market and the system of capitalist economy does not automatically lead to equilibrium. As opposed to the Keynesians, the school of regulation includes historical context. Contrary to Marxist theories, the school of regulation assumes that within capitalist system there is a possibility of overcoming crises. A strong accent is put on the institutional context which implies intellectual influence of institutional economics.

The regulation approach is not an ideologically or methodologically coherent doctrine, the opposite, it is heterogeneous. However, the majority of representatives accept the basic assumptions. This refers to the concept of regulation.

In the centre of regulation theory there is capitalism and contradictions within its nature [11, p.14-15] In their analysis of capitalist dynamics and economic breakdowns in particular periods of economic history, regulationists assume three levels of analysis. The first level refers to a production method, which is understood as 'every specific form of relationship of production and exchange, i.e. social relationship regulating production and reproduction of material conditions indispensable for living in a society' [12, p. 46]. This category refers to, both, the way the society is organized, and to the regulation mode of basic relationship between individuals, nature and production.

The second level of regulation approach refers to the category of accumulation regime. Accumulation regime means economic and social regularities which allow accumulation in a long period of time These regularities comprise a dominant mechanism which in a certain period of time generates economic growth, as well as, and include sources of productivity growth, distribution of added value, organization of production process, or wage relation. Accumulation regime explains the stability of macroeconomic processes in the long period of time.

The third level of analysis includes institutional forms which can be defined as 'every codification of one or more basic, social relationships'[13, p. 2]. The French Regulation School describes five institutional forms which determine the way a society functions. They are as follows:

- a form of monetary system (connected with payment system, monetary policy, etc);
- a form of wage relation (conditions of employment, wages, employment rate, work organization, etc.);
- a form of competition (in the wide understanding referring to commercial relations, in the narrow understanding referring to the level of concentration on the market, price changes and competition between employees);
- a form of state interventions (the main subject of social and economic intervention);
- a form of accession to the international regime (international relations with reference to relation between a particular economy and other countries) [13, p. 2].

The hierarchy of institutional forms is not universal. The forms undergo a constant modification and depend on a current production mode [14, p.543; 12, p.48]. The coherence of institutional forms conditions the functioning of accumulation regime and a production mode.

Regulations indicate two basic regimes of capitalistic accumulation. The first one, the competition regime, started developing in the second half of the 19th century and was applied until the beginning of the 20th century. This regime was a result of coherence between current institutional forms, among which the most important were strong capital accumulation, strong competition on the markets (between businesses, but also on the labour market), flexibility of markets, lack of collective law regulations and resulting from this situation no workers' rights, and finally limited interference of the state into the economic processes. The second regime, regime of monopolistic accumulation prevailed after the Second World War until the slump in

the 1970's. This regime was based on intensive accumulation, mass production which generated economies of scale and high production profits, Fordian wage mode, mass consumption and a new more important role of the state. However, according to regulationists, the Fordian accumulation regime had mechanisms which led the capitalist system to the slump in the 1970's [15, p. 93 and further].

In search of the contemporary regime of accumulation regulationists observe the evolution of forms in all institutional areas, and together with it merging of new phenomena, such as liberalization of international exchange, increase of unemployment rate, deregulation and flexibilization of labour market, the process of globalization and financialization. The evolution of institutional forms leads to a new accumulation regime based economies financialization, the so called patrimonial regime which, in turn, leads to developing of patrimonial capitalism. [16, p. 3]. It has to be remarked that the contemporary accumulation regime and its features are still a subject of debate within the regulation school.

Shaping institutional forms and an obligatory accumulation regime determine the regulation mode. Regulation is understood as an the whole of mechanisms which influence the reproduction of a system comprising both economic structures and the current social relations [12, p. 8]. Regulation is also described as a group of procedures and behaviour, both of individuals and groups, which allow a reproduction of social relations thanks to historically determined institutional forms, and which allow to sustain the current accumulation regime [12, p. 54]. The accumulation mode, determined by predominant institutional forms, from one side, and a current accumulation regime from another, shapes the system and guarantees relative stable capitalist accumulation.

Regulationists distinguish several modes of capitalist accumulation. The 19th century was dominated by competitive regulation mode within which competition and market mechanisms guaranteed all the adjustments in the social and economic systems. In the interwar period hybrid regulation mode reigned. The Fordian regulation mode, which was also called, monopolistic regulation mode, dominated the post-war period until the slump as a result of energy crisis and it was an outcome of accumulation regime based on Fordian social relations and an dynamic growth in wages due to increase in production profits. The process of globalization, as well as, economy liberalization which have intensified since the 1980's undermined the this regulation mode. A new regulation mode has not yet been clearly defined.

A synthetic presentation of the French School of Regulation fundamental assumptions shows a particular significance of coherence within institutional conditions and the dynamics of institutional changes. An analysis of institutional interrelation allows to understand the specific character of a given capitalist system, and as a consequence, to explain the reasons for crises hitting the system of capitalist economy.

Regulation has become a significant subject of research, particularly in the era of the increasing intervention from the state. While carrying out the analysis, the admitted perspective has to be clearly determined because of divergences between

the Anglo-American and the French School of Regulation theories.

Anglo-American regulation theories and the more widespread than the French Approach and the deal with strictly economic approach to regulation.(the positive-normative theory, the economic regulation theory, the capture theory). Regulation is interpreted as an active and conscious activity form the state of other groups concerning a complementary role of the state in economic processes towards market mechanism.

The French School of Regulation interprets this category in a different way. The question of regulation in the French approach does not appear in the discussion on the economic role of the state in economy of failures in coordinating the market by market mechanism. Regulation is understood as institutional adjustment of economic and social system. The range of the category of regulation in this interpretation is much wider. Apart form economics dimension, it has institutional and social connotations.

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УДК 159.922:377

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ІДЕНТИФІКАЦІЯ ТА ІДЕНТИЧНІСТЬ: ОСНОВНІ ХАРАКТЕРИСТИКИ

У даній статті узагальнено теоретичні підходи до визначення таких понять, як «ідентифікація», «ідентичність». Стисло подано результати зарубіжних та вітчизняних досліджень означених понять. Наведено схематичні зображення формування процесу ідентифікації та чинників ідентичності.